I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing recognition in both the professional and popular literatures that water scarcity is a key policy issue that is essential to address in evaluating the effects of climate change and long-term sustainability of economic growth. 1 Glennon's (2009) Water presents a surprising riddle. We can neither make nor destroy it, so our supply is fixed yet it's exhaustible because, as a shared resource used repeatedly, some uses preclude future reuse. Water policy suffers from a profound discontinuity between science and law. . . . The result epitomizes the tragedy of the commons: limitless access to a finite resource. (p. 324) Those evaluating the water problem usually conclude prices must be reformed so that incentives facing water users reflect this scarcity. Demand functions provide the basic economic relationships required to predict how water use will respond to such changes. This is where the problems arise. Access to detailed information on household water use, including household attributes (i.e., lot size, landscaping composition, and presence of swimming pools), the composition of use (i.e., indoor versus outdoor usage), and pricing, is limited. The combination of concerns over confidentiality and, in some cases, legislation precluding access to microlevel data for individual customers served by water providers creates a limited information setting for understanding water demand. Nonetheless, following Chetty's (2009) arguments, it is possible under some conditions to recover key structural water demand parameters without either a structural model or the ability to use detailed data on specific customers.
In our application, the demand parameter we estimate is the price slope of a linear water demand function for residential consumers at different water consumption levels. This relationship is treated as a local approximation and as a result is estimated separately at different levels of water usage. We use this parameter to construct estimates for the price elasticity of The authors are, respectively, assistant professor, Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus; Regents' Professor of Economics, Arizona State University, Phoenix, university fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., and research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts; research analyst, Analysis Group, Inc., Boston; assistant professor, School of Urban and Regional Planning and Public Policy Center, University of Iowa, Iowa City. demand, a key policy variable of interest to local water providers. Our analysis uses order statistics from distributions describing water usage that are derived using microlevel information on residential metered water use and prices. This strategy protects the confidentiality of individual water customers. We control for unobservables by exploiting our ability to link consumption and price data to spatial units. An important element in our strategy stems from the ability to observe price and water consumption changes over time.
In most water demand applications, increasing block rate structures confound a reduced-form approach for recovering information about a structural parameter such as the quantity response to a price change. Our application has only two blocks. Nearly all residential consumers are in the second block and do not switch blocks when water prices change. In many areas of the country where there is metering and pricing of water, more complex increasing block pricing structures are often found. Pricing policies with multiple blocks transform the methods required to use records on households' water consumption patterns for estimating how the quantity of water used responds to price changes. 2 They also make the requirements for detailed information on household attributes even more important. As a result of the increased modeling requirements associated with more complex pricing structures, it has been difficult to offer a detailed characterization of the differences in water demand responses across small versus large residential users. This shortcoming has direct policy relevance because there is broad consensus in the United States that affordable access to water for "ordinary" household use must be maintained for lowerincome groups.
This paper proposes a simple method for estimating the price elasticity of demand that meets policy needs and can accommodate current data limitations. It can also be implemented in the presence of simple increasing block pricing structures, such as the two-block structure used in Phoenix, Arizona. Thus, our method can estimate how water usage responds to price changes under the typical conditions confronting applied researchers with limited access to detailed household-level microdata. Our data sample was constructed using the thresholds for percentiles of water consumption at the census block group level for a single municipal provider in Phoenix. Using the changes in water consumption for selected percentiles over time, our approach controls for housing attributes, landscape attributes that do not change, and socioeconomic characteristics of consumers at the block group level while maintaining confidentiality of individual households' records. The time horizon for our analysis is short and spans the years 2000 to 2003. As a result, the variables we cannot observe at a finer level of spatial or temporal resolution, such as the socioeconomic characteristics of households in each block group or their housing attributes and the landscape features of their properties, are unlikely to change over this time period. The linear specification together with a focus on how water consumption changes with price changes implies that these effects will be differenced from the model. Nevertheless, to evaluate the potential importance of changes in the demographic features of households, which cannot be measured with the data generally available for research purposes on water demand, we estimated our model with a subsample of the data that eliminated all block groups experiencing greater than a 10% change in ownership (proxied by sales) or new construction between the year 2000 baseline and year 2003. The results with this smaller subsample largely coincide both quantitatively and qualitatively to our findings with the full sample. This stability in the estimates supports the maintained assumption that is required for our approach. The estimates across different-sized water consumers are unlikely to be driven by changes in demographics or new construction.
The seasonal and temporal changes in the Phoenix municipal water system's residential water rates are used to reconstruct a record of price changes that are exogenously imposed on customers. The Phoenix water provider is a regulated utility that is allowed to adjust prices annually to cover cost increases. By matching months that experienced changes in the marginal price for the same pricing block, it is possible to isolate the quantity adjustment associated with these specific price changes and be assured there is no shifting of households between price blocks. 3 The findings derived using this simple strategy are striking. Despite limited price variation, we estimate statistically significant demand elasticities. Our results also allow the price responsiveness to be distinguished by percentiles of consumption. Isolating the price responsiveness of demand by the amount of water consumption, we are able to establish that there are relatively large differences in elasticities, with the largest water users appearing to be more price inelastic.
Estimation involves matching years where we compare two normal precipitation years as well as a normal precipitation year to an exceptionally dry year. Separate models are estimated for winter and summer demand. A comparison of the estimates for approximately comparable price changes when there are different patterns of natural precipitation conditions provides a simple plausibility check for the logic of the model. That is, we should expect that natural increases in the need for water (due to dry conditions) would make households with significant outside uses of water less responsive to price increases. This is exactly what we find. The estimates of price elasticities for residential customers in the summer months across all consumption percentiles reveal they are much less responsive to price changes when the price comparison involves responses in water use during dry conditions.
II. MODELING WATER DEMAND

Background
Most of the recent literature measuring the price elasticity of demand has been based on 3 This strategy is consistent with Chetty's (2009) call for a middle ground between structural and reduced-form (or treatment-effect) approaches to policy evaluation. He describes how research in public economics has focused on what he labels a "sufficient statistic," or estimation strategies that measure parameters in transparent ways with credible identifying information. He calls for a focus on the key economic parameter for policy evaluation and often welfare statements. the discrete/continuous choice (DCC) model developed by Hausman (1979) for applications to labor supply. 4 For demand models derived from choices with convex budget sets (increasing block price structures), one need only specify a conditional demand function to estimate the model. This relationship describes how the quantity demanded responds to the marginal price within each budget segment (corresponding to the segment associated with each step in the increasing block pricing structure). Conventional practice assumes this demand function includes two errors. One is usually hypothesized to be associated with household preference heterogeneity not captured in observable variables. This feature is known to the household but not to the analyst. The second is an error hypothesized to be unknown to both the household and the analyst. It could arise from leaks in the water system, measurement errors, or a composite of both effects. The two error terms allow the model to describe choice outcomes. This structure is especially important for being able to include some households' consumption choices that would appear to have them falling at the kinks of the budget constraint.
As a rule, the consumption decision process is explained as if there were two distinct steps: (1) a description of the probability that consumption will be in one of the budget segments (or at a kink), 5 and (2) conditional on each budget segment there is a conditional demand function describing how the quantity of water demanded relates to the marginal price. 6 At a kink, there is no such relationship be-4 See Burtless and Hausman (1978) for discussion of the model with nonconvex budget constraint, Heckman (1983) for a critique, and Reiss and White (2006) for discussion of how welfare analysis can be undertaken with nonlinear budget constraints. An alternative structure based on using the first-order conditions from the constrained utility maximization problem is developed and illustrated by Strong and Smith (2010) . 5 There will be multiple kinks for more complex increasing block structures with several steps in the increasing block structure. 6 In practice we simply observe households' consumption that implies their consumption affects the marginal price they face. The steps are used to separate the way the statistical model uses available information so that the inherent simultaneity is represented consistently in the econometric analysis.
cause the model implies demand is higher than the highest value of the lower block but lower than the lowest value of the next-highest block. The parameters of the conditional demand are assumed constant across segments to identify the model. 7 This assumed constant parameter structure for all budget segments does not simplify the relationship between conditional and unconditional price elasticities.
As Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) demonstrate, the unconditional price elasticity is a function of both the conditional price elasticity and the income elasticity. As a result, the relationship of the unconditional price elasticity to the conditional elasticity is not clear. Both the ranking of the two measures and the magnitude of the absolute difference between them cannot be signed a priori. For their application Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins found the unconditional price elasticity of demand was smaller in absolute magnitude than the conditional elasticity. Because the rate subsidies associated with increasing block price structures are small, the price differences between blocks are small, and the expenditure share for water in a household's overall budget is small; the authors suggest their results may provide a reasonable guide for the relationship with most communities' residential water demands.
Nonetheless, despite this relatively optimistic conclusion of the Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins study, the experience with the DCC model for water applications has been mixed. Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) reported the first such application. They found large (in absolute value) conditional price elasticities and report an unconditional elasticity for a price structure change that is also large compared to the literature. Both the Espey, Espey, and Shaw (1997) and the Dalhuisen et al. (2003) meta-analyses of water demand studies found the majority of the price elasticity estimates were less than unity in absolute magnitude. Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins's results are consistent with these findings in that their conditional elasticity es-timate was approximately − 0.34 and simulated unconditional estimate was − 0.59.
The Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins's sample is also quite unique in that it pools household-level data across 11 urban areas in the United States. 8 One concern the authors raise is that the very advantage of their data in displaying how households responded to a variety of price structures may create a cause for concern. That is, the community's tastes for water conservation may be reflected in the provider's rate structure. Communities with several blocks and high marginal prices for the top blocks may also have strong mandates for conservation. This logic seems especially relevant for public water providers where revenues cannot exceed costs. Under these conditions revenues in excess of the costs of service for the highest blocks must be offset by revenues below the costs of service for lower blocks in order to meet the zero "profit" constraint.
In these situations the estimation of demand functions that are structured to be conditional to a rate structure may also reflect the unobserved taste for conservation. After a series of tests for this potential explanation of their findings Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins conclude that they cannot dismiss the hypothesis that the underlying city-level taste for conservation, through the design selected for each community's price structure, may contribute to the observed higher (in absolute value) elasticities. It would not be possible to reproduce their study using a single water provider because the structure of a single system's price schedule is usually quite stable. Year-to-year changes in prices generally involve small changes in marginal prices for selected blocks that are unlikely to have sufficient variability in prices to distinguish the effect of a change in price from changes in conservation motives over time. 9 Recently Nataraj and Hanemann (2011) have exploited a natural demand shock for water pricing in Santa Cruz, California, using a regression discontinuity design to estimate how households responded to a new block in the block pricing schedule. In response to a prolonged period of drought and after using price increases and various nonprice controls from 1987 to 1992, in February 1995 the Santa Cruz local government introduced new rates to begin in June 1995. Prior to this time there was a two-block system. The 1994 rates priced the first 800 cubic feet (8 CCF) on the bimonthly metering schedule at $0.65/CCF, and the next units of water were priced at $1.55/CCF. 10 The new third rate applied to consumption over 40 CCF and was initially priced at $3.14/CCF for use in excess of 40 CCF in a two-month period.
This pricing scheme implied households consuming 40 or more CCF would experience a change in the marginal price of consumption over this threshold. To exploit this change they use prior water consumption as the threshold distinguishing treatment and control households and investigate the effects of excluding households close to the 40 CCF cutoff. Their findings indicate households did respond to the price change. This result was confirmed in both robustness checks for the threshold and falsification tests for the basic logic underlying the design. Unfortunately, the discrete nature of the price change and the fact that it was limited to the largest consumers made it difficult to develop general conclusions on the extent of price responsiveness to compare to the literature. The authors did note that the water consumption response estimated for the 100% price increase implied a short-run price elasticity of approximately − 0.12. This estimate falls at the low end of past estimates.
Our method builds on Nataraj and Hanemann's (2011) logic and exploits a set of changes in the rate structure for residential customers in Phoenix, Arizona, that takes place with every change of season. These rate changes are common across many water pro-10 Increases in rates of 6% in June 1995 and 5% in June 1996 and 1997 were part of the plan to increase rates. The 5% rate increases in 1996 were to apply to the new block. viders in the southwestern United States and are intended to reflect seasonal changes in demand and supply of water. We adapt a proposal made by Borenstein (2009) for considering residential electricity demand and are able to consider how these changes affect consumers with different total amounts of water usage at different times of the year. Our approach does not estimate a structural demand. Instead, we hypothesize a price response that can be locally approximated for small price changes with a linear form. Changes in the distributions of water use in local neighborhoods, defined by census block groups, associated with price increases over time are used to estimate elasticities for different consumption percentiles. More specifically, we use the order statistics for these consumption distributions to characterize the responses for different-sized water consumers to price changes.
A Quasi-Experimental Approach for Measuring Price Elasticities for Residential Water Demand
Our analysis considers a single municipal water provider with a two-block pricing structure. 11 Rates change in different months throughout the year corresponding to low-, medium-, and high-usage periods. Water and wastewater are priced on the same metered records for this water provider. Thus, changes in either price affect incentives for water usage. The consumption threshold for the increase in marginal price between blocks changes from 600 CCF in low water use periods (winter) to 1,000 CCF in high water use periods (summer). Our estimation strategy exploits increases in rates over time that vary by different amounts for each usage period, along with the ability to link individual meters to census block groups. Each block group contains the water meters for approximately 600 residential customers. To consider the first component of our analysis, changes in mar- 11 The use of a block pricing structure is common for water providers; while the number of blocks and cutoff points between blocks vary widely across different providers.
ginal prices, we use a linear specification for water demand as in equation [1] .
where w ijt is the water consumed by household i in the month j of year t. Based on the metered records for w ijt , we know p jtb , which is the bth block's marginal price in month j of year t. This is the block that corresponds to the water consumption 
where k is the constant increment to the marginal price experienced between years (i.e., and ). Using this specification, the int + a t tercept in this difference equation estimates the effect of price on water demand, assuming the price change between the two months is identical for each consumer. These differences can be pooled over months if the price increment is the same. The differencing causes the first-order effects of the demographic features, z i 's, characterizing individual households as well as the influences of housing attributes and landscape to drop from the estimating model. This outcome assumes these variables do not change at the scale of the census block group over time. We will consider the potential importance of changes in the composition of the homes (and indirectly the households) in each census block group below.
12 The Phoenix water provider changes rates every year to cover increased water delivery costs and maintenance.
One might argue the lowest block's price should also be included in the vector of z i 's due to an adjustment in virtual income associated with the change in expenditures on the first block of water. If the lower block's price changes with linearity assumed for the effect of income on water demand and all households remain in the top consumption block, we would expect the changes in this price to appear through the income term. However, the quantity limits distinguishing the blocks do not change for a given season, so this adjustment to income would be the same for all households. They would imply an adjustment to the intercept for our difference model. In our case, over the years considered the first block's price does not change.
Differencing eliminates the effects of the first block's price if the sample's consumption remains in the second block and the first block price does not change. Fortunately, as we explain below, there are no households with changes between the two blocks in response to the price changes for our sample. We did observe over the full year that some households changed consumption blocks at the lowest levels of water consumption in May. Considering the consumption levels realized by the top 80% to 85% of the households in Phoenix and removing May from our sample, we avoid the problems that would arise with households changing consumption blocks as prices change.
Equation [2] is best considered an approximation. It focuses on first-order effects and thus assumes the effect of price on water demand is locally constant. We would expect that price response would depend on the features of each residential consumer's living situation, such as outdoor landscape, number of bathrooms, the composition of water-using appliances, and so forth. We attempt to take account of these effects by estimating the changes in water demand at different levels of water consumption. More specifically, we construct differences in the thresholds defining the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for water consumption in each block group to arrive at our estimating equation given in [3] :
njt + a njt Consumption percentiles are represented by the subscript in equation [3] . The precise n thresholds could be different households in different years. By construction, they will be in the same block group. As noted earlier, the demographic attributes of households can be measured only at the block group level, which precludes using them as a basis for identifying the attributes of the specific household located at each consumption percentile. Since the time intervals involved in our study period are small, it is reasonable to assume the differences in demographics thresholds are small as well. This is a limitation that arises from the confidentiality requirements imposed on these types of data. We do not have distributions for the economic and demographic attributes of households in the census block groups over time. This formulation is similar to the issues raised by Borenstein (2009) and follows his proposal to use consumption percentiles for modeling electricity demand. 13 Given the assumption that the household defining each threshold has approximately the same attributes, differencing the same percentile across time for each block group will eliminate these first-order effects. It also removes cross-sectional features of neighborhoods that are constant across time, such as xeric or mesic landscape, that might interact with the consumption responses to marginal price changes.
As noted earlier, only households at the lowest level of consumption display sufficient reactions in their water use to the price changes over time to observe a shift from one price block to another. Moreover, for this percentile, the changes that lead to shifts across pricing blocks are limited to one month, May. This month precedes the high-use and highest-price season. All of the remaining points on the distribution fall in the highest block. 13 Borenstein's approach is based on Saez's (2002) argument that kinked budget constraints should induce bunching of individuals at the lower prices associated with the kink points.
By focusing on the highest and lowest water usage periods of the year corresponding to winter and summer months, which do not include May, we avoid the issue of block switching. Our estimates discussed in the next section report all percentiles. Nonetheless, for the lowest-consumption groups, demand responses over the full year may well reflect the influence of the price threshold between blocks. For this reason the estimated water consumption response to price changes estimated using our method is best treated as appropriate for residential consumers that account for all but the lowest 10% to 15% of water consumption.
Our strategy does allow us to estimate different conditional price elasticities for different-sized residential users. To our knowledge, this issue has not been considered in the past literature. Nataraj and Hanemann (2011) measure the local price responsiveness for one class of demanders. We can extend that logic to consider nearly the full distribution of residential consumers. Moreover, it appears these types of distinctions can be important for pricing policy when there are concerns with assuring affordable access to low-income users, who tend to be in the lowest use percentiles.
III. DATA AND PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATES
Our analysis is based on records for residential meters served by the municipal Phoenix water system. We know the year, month, amount of water used, and the price schedule for each meter, which we treat as a user. These data do not include other information about these households. 14 After matching each meter to its census block group and information on weather conditions experienced in each block group for each month and year, we are left with between 993 and 996 records for 14 This same limitation faced Nataraj and Hanemann. They used the average values for demographic variables for each block group. Our strategy recognizes that the structure of the price changes applied to every residential customer. As a result it is possible to difference out the effects of demographics and focus on the price-and weather-related differences in demand for the full distribution of consumers. 
each month in the three years comprising our sample. 15 Our analysis relies on isolating changes in the marginal prices for water over time. These changes are not associated with any household moving between pricing blocks. Table 1 displays the marginal prices for the highest water usage blocks by month for the three years in our sample. This table depicts the changes in marginal prices that occur for the highest block in different seasons. There are some months that display differences from the low (January, February), medium in two parts (March, December) plus (April, May, October, November), and high (June, July, August, September) periods due to the timing of allowed adjustments in the rate structure.
We use these monthly price differences for the low and the high usage periods as exogenous price differences to construct a quasiexperiment. During this period, the bulk of the new housing construction in the Phoenix area occurred outside the Phoenix water provider's district, making the assumption of constant housing and neighborhood attributes reasonable given the short time periods we consider.
As Table 1 suggests, we selected three years for analysis and treat the year 2000 as our base year. This strategy provides two dif-15 Block groups are constant across years. The slight difference in numbers of block groups is a result of missing data. We use the effects of these weather differences on our elasticity estimates to judge the plausibility of our strategy for estimating price responsiveness. Table 2 compares the weather variables and percentiles of consumption use for each of the three years.
Our models also include controls for monthly differences in the minimum temperature, the precipitation, and the days of precipitation interpolated for each block group. These data came from approximately 15 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) monitoring stations located around the Phoenix area that collected information during the months used for our analysis. 16 Each monitoring station reports daily data on temperatures and precipitation. We averaged temperatures in each month at each monitor to form a series of monthly specific temperature variables. For precipitation, we used monthly counts of the total number of days in which rainfall was detected as well as the total amount of rainfall (measured in The model is estimated separately for each of two subsamples and each percentile, restricting the data to include only winter (low: January, February) and only summer (high: June, July, August, September) seasons.
Before discussing our estimates for price responsiveness we consider the implications of using a difference in an order statistic as the dependent variable in each model. We examine the quantity response to price changes at the kth percentile of consumption. There is a well-established literature on the properties of order statistics used in multivariate statistical models. Linear functions of order statistics are often known as L statistics and as L estimators when they are used to estimate parameters of an underlying distribution. When the L statistic is a function of a finite number of central order statistics or a finite number of extreme order statistics, we can use established properties of their asymptotic joint distribution to obtain the limiting distribution for the L statistics. For example, in the case of a fixed number of central order statistics the limiting distribution is normal under mild conditions on the parent distribution. Indeed, asymptotic normality has been established by putting relatively mild conditions on the weighting function or the parent distribution. 17 Both are consistent with what would be conventional practice with analyses of microdata. Thus, it seems reasonable to interpret the test statistics for our parameter estimates as asymptotically normal and follow conventional practices in interpreting the test statistics. Table 3 reports our estimates for the first difference model for these two seasons and for each paired price change (2000-2003 and 2000-2002) . The intercept in each set of models is the key focus of the analysis for evaluating the effects of price on consumption. This parameter is precisely estimated in comparing summer consumption for normal weather years. For winter use, large users are not responsive to price but otherwise respond during summer months. The changes in our estimates of the intercept are striking when we consider a price change that allows a normal and a dry year to be compared. All users are price responsive, but the pattern of adjustment 17 A good overview of these conditions with citations to the primary results is found in Chapter 8 of Arnold, Balakrishnan, and Nagaraja's (2008) is informative. In the summer months all users, but especially large users, are less responsive to price changes during dry conditions.
In comparing a dry and normal year, changes in precipitation are the same sign in both winter and summer months. The amount of precipitation, as Table 2 shows, has declined, so the change is negative between 2002 and 2000. This precipitation effect increases demand in both winter and summer. By contrast, in comparing the two normal years, the effect depends upon season. To assess the overall impact we need to consider changes in the amount of precipitation and its distribution over days. Changes in each of these variables have opposite signs for the summer and winter models.
For the comparison of the normal and dry year, the two effects are consistent between the winter and summer models. Reductions in precipitation lead to increases in water use, and reductions in the number of days of precipitation reduce water usage for both seasons. Precipitation reductions in the winter increase water use, while in the summer the effect depends on both the change in amount and days of precipitation. 18 Table 4 presents the primary results of our analysis: estimates of the demand elasticity using comparisons between two normal years as well as a normal and a dry year to identify the price effect. Our estimates using percentiles can be distinguished by the size of residential customers. This distinction, as expected based on work by Nataraj and Hanemann (2011) , plays an important role in parsing out the heterogeneity in householdlevel estimates for the price elasticities.
Comparing the first panel of Table 4 for normal/normal versus the second panel for normal/dry we see directly that price responsiveness is reduced quite substantially for the summer months when the overall situation is abnormally dry. In winter months, we see re- sponsiveness to price changes across all consumption percentiles. We also find that larger users are uniformly less responsive to price across all seasons regardless of weather conditions. To our knowledge this is the first time a water demand study has been able to extract these distinctions and control for the effects of the block structure. As we noted above, data limitations due to confidentiality restrictions generally preclude access to detailed demographic and economic features of residential water consumers. Our approach is an effort to exploit the information that can be observed along with the price variation that occurs over time to estimate local price elasticities for residential customers who consume different amounts of water. A concern with our strategy is that the resulting estimates may be partially reflecting changes in the composition of residential customers and not simply a response to the price changes. We cannot completely eliminate the potential for this confounding of effects. However, analysis over a short time horizon should limit the potential for this effect.
To gauge whether this argument is reasonable we used data obtained from the Maricopa County assessor on single-family residential homes to calculate measures of the percentage sold and percentage of new homes constructed in each of our 996 block groups during the years 2001 through 2003 relative to the existing stock of housing in the baseline year 2000. Summaries of these block group measures are shown in Table 5 . From this table, we see that at the block group occupying the 90th percentile in terms of housing turnover, only 5.1% of the existing housing stock in year 2003 is new construction, while 8.2% of the year 2000 housing stock experienced changes in ownership. These increments increased to 18.1% and 29.1%, respectively, at the block group representing the 95th percentile in turnover.
To gauge the robustness of our estimated elasticities to changes in ownership and new construction at the block group level, as proxy variables reflecting the potential for a changes in the demographic and economic features of the residential customers in each block group, we eliminated all block groups experiencing greater than a 10% change in ownership, measured using housing sales, or new construction between the 2000 baseline and year 2003. This restriction decreased the number of block groups for our sample from 996 to 914. Estimates for demand elasticities with this restricted sample are given in Table 6 . These results largely coincide both quantitatively and qualitatively to our results in Table 4 , suggesting that our results are not driven by changes in demographics or new construction. This robustness check confirms the assumptions on constant demographics within water consumption percentiles seem likely to hold and thus our estimates are likely to reflect local price responses.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
When the DCC approach was first proposed to model labor supply and evaluate the effect of policies to change income taxes, Heckman (1983) raised a number of questions about the ability of analysts to assume the actual points specifying the kinks in the budget constraint, due to tax structure, were exogenous. In addition, he noted that with exogenous kink points there should be "bunching at the kinks." 19 These kink points are exogenous in the case of increasing block price structures for water; however, in preliminary analysis of the Phoenix residential water data we did not observe this bunching. This may reflect the simplified rate structure residents in the Phoenix area faced, where most residential custom-19 See Heckman (1983, 71). ers are in the highest block throughout the year due to the relatively low consumption threshold defining pricing blocks. As a result, there would be no meaningful variation in the marginal price for these customers. The seasonal changes in rates would be experienced by all water consumers at the same time, and responses to the price changes would be difficult to separate from changes in water needs due to the temperature changes throughout the year. The Phoenix system's price structure is not unique. As a result, it may be reasonable to assume the opportunities for quantity adjustments leading to movements among blocks for many water systems are limited and the distinction between conditional and unconditional price responses small. The "action" in estimating price responses may well be in considering price changes over time and allowing flexibility in the nature of the price response by the overall quantity of water consumed in a month.
A further limitation to what has become the conventional approach to demand modeling, as Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) suggest, is the concern about whether the price structure is truly exogenous. Under these conditions pooling data across communities to provide variation in price schedules may also include differences inherent in the conservation motives of the households in these communities. These types of applications also would not have sufficient information to distinguish taste parameters for conservation from the parameters reflecting price responses. Limiting the analysis to a single community would not provide a sufficient basis for identifying the price response either. This concern would lead to preferences for models that do not start with the conditional demand function defined for a given price structure and instead a framework that begins from a preference specification such as Strong and Smith's (2010) . Of course, this approach adds considerable structure in the assumed specification for preferences.
We have proposed a different strategy for estimating demand responses more consistent with the compromise advocated by Chetty (2009) . It combines two elements. The first is Borenstein's proposal to consider how order statistics, summarizing the distribution of use that is constructed at the census block group level, change with exogenous price changes. The second element involves exploiting changes in marginal prices over time (to reflect provider cost increases) that can be matched by month so the position of water consumption in the price structure is unchanged. This matching process assures the increment to the marginal price can be used as an exogenous change from the household's perspective. As a result, the price change can be treated as a type of treatment for evaluating the change in water usage.
Our application to the Phoenix residential market indicates this approach is remarkably effective. It does not require the structural assumptions of the DCC approach, allows estimates of price responsiveness by size (in terms of water use) of customer, and was also effective in discriminating how lower than normal precipitation in an arid desert environment can reduce price responsiveness, especially for large users. We interpret this ability to detect a role for differences in seasonal rainfall as confirming evidence that supports our direct approach. It also indicates that matching a simple theoretical model of demand response with an exogenous source of price variation can allow measurement of demand elasticities. Our use of the order statistic to characterize demand provides a strategy that recognizes the importance of a price change to any individual household will depend on the amount of water used. More complex increasing block price schedules can be accommodated in this logic with enough ability to observe within block changes in marginal prices over time.
For empirical demand estimation, our findings of substantial heterogeneity and variation over time should be informative for the specification of future structural models. In addition to informing future structural models, there are also several limitations of the method provided in this paper that could be confronted in future research. Perhaps most glaring is that we rely on the relatively short time frame of study and relatively nonbinding pricing block structure of Phoenix. Confronting endogeneity from changes in price blocks, differences in demand across larger geographic areas such as metropolitan areas, and incorporation of longer-run changes in response through changes in appliances or landscape remain open questions deserving of future research. By demonstrating the ability to overcome the typical setting of limited access to microdata on water consumption, we hope that this approach offers a practical basis for meeting many of the needs of policy makers managing local water resources. Reliable estimates of price elasticities distinguished by seasonal and weather conditions can help to assess how water use (and provider revenues) will change with price changes.
